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ABSTRACT
In 2014 an intense debate over the state of terrorism literature was
published. Sageman [2014. The stagnation in terrorism research.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 565–580. doi:10.1080/
09546553.2014.895649] claimed that the ﬁeld had stagnated,
mainly due to lack of data sharing between government
departments that have access to valuable information that could
inform our understanding, and researchers who have the skills
and expertise to make sense of this. However, others were more
positive regarding the literature, highlighting areas where
progress has been made [e.g. McCauley, & Moskalenko (2014).
Some things We think We’ve learned since 9/11: A commentary
on Marc Sageman’s ‘The stagnation in terrorism research’.
Terrorism and Political Violence, 26(4), 601–606. doi:10.1080/
09546553.2014.895653; Stern (2014). Response to Marc Sageman’s
‘The stagnation in terrorism research’. Terrorism and Political
Violence, 26(4), 607–613. doi:10.1080/09546553.2014.895654;
Taylor (2014). If I were you, I wouldn’t start from here: Response to
Marc Sageman’s The stagnation in terrorism research’. Terrorism
and Political Violence, 26(4), 581–586. doi:10.1080/
09546553.2014.895650]. Here we re-visit the literature and identify
advances that have been made since 2014. We explore ongoing
challenges for terrorism researchers and practitioners, and options
for ways forward to ensure evidence-based responses to terrorist
individuals and groups.
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Introduction
Five years ago, Marc Sageman published a fairly damning account of what he described as
‘the stagnation in terrorism research’ (Sageman, 2014, p. 565). Sageman claimed that,
despite a profusion of literature in this ﬁeld, answers to the question ‘What leads a
person to turn to political violence?’ continued to elude academics and the US intelligence
community within which he had been working. This was, he claimed, due to issues such as
(i) a reactive and somewhat unsystematic government strategy regarding funding
decisions and setting requirements, and (ii) a lack of data, and absence of data sharing
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between governments that have access to data about terrorists and extremists, and
researchers who have the skills, resources and expertise to make sense of this infor-
mation. Moreover, Sageman claimed that whilst there are numerous self-appointed
‘experts’ and a wealth of literature in this area, many of these experts are not scholars,
and most accounts are journalistic rather than empirical in nature. As such, the focus
of these were often on what authors perceive as particularly interesting elements of a
narrative, rather than on any careful consideration and rigorous analysis of the
breadth of reasons why individuals may be drawn into terrorism. A lack of scrutiny
and rigour means that many of the speculations made and peoples’ beliefs about extre-
mism and terrorism lack a sound, empirical basis. This, plus a lack of data sharing and
strategic and systemic ﬂaws regarding whom and what governments should fund has
led to ‘an unbridgeable gap’ between academics and intelligence communities
(Sageman, 2014, p. 565).
The current article is based on a systematic review of the literature that was conducted
to re-visit two core themes in Sageman’s critique, which he saw as underlying this ‘stagna-
tion’ and the aforementioned gap between intelligence communities and academia. The
two core themes under investigation are: (i) the need for more data-driven, scientiﬁc
research by academics who have the necessary knowledge and skills to ensure ﬁndings
are applicable to real-world problems; and (ii) issues regarding government systems
and strategies that inﬂuence our progress towards understanding of ‘What leads a
person to turn to political violence?’. More generally, the article also explores ﬁndings
from the literature review to identify recent developments in the ﬁeld and to understand
which gaps have been ﬁlled and which remain. This is important for both academics and
government policy makers, in order to ensure that future eﬀorts are based on and
informed by current evidence-based understanding and to inﬂuence where future
research should focus.
Criticisms of terrorism research are not new, and complexities facing the ﬁeld were
highlighted many years prior to Sageman’s critique (for example, see Gurr, 1988; Reich
& Laquer, 1998; Schmid & Jongman, 1985). More recently, others have also noted the
need for more empirical research in this area, for primary sources of data to be used
and for the gap between academic research and counterterrorism intelligence (in terms
of data sharing and the skills needed to make sense of this) to be narrowed (e.g.
Borum, 2012; Desmarais, Simons-Rudolph, Brugh, Schilling, & Hoggan, 2017; Ranstorp,
2007; Schmid, 2016; Schuurman, 2018). This longstanding self-reﬂection by those
seeking to understand terrorism demonstrates that researchers are not ignorant to the
limitations associated with this ﬁeld of study, and that serious attempts to address
these have been made.
The current article examines key areas where research and understanding have
advanced since 2014, ﬁve years on from Sageman’s somewhat controversial paper. First,
we review recent publications to describe the increase in empirical studies on terrorism
and demonstrate that academics have overcome obstacles regarding data access to
develop a more nuanced, evidence-based understanding of diﬀerent types of terrorism
(Section One). Next, we extrapolate key ongoing, data-speciﬁc challenges for terrorism
researchers, from the publications included in Section 1 (Section Two). We then focus
on governments, their role in terrorism research and collaborations with academia, outlin-
ing where advances have been made and where challenges remain (Section Three).
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Finally, we look at evidence-based Counter Terrorism in practice, and explore ongoing
issues facing CT practitioners and potential solutions to these (Section Four).
Section one: advances in empirical research
A search of the literature commenced with the authors reviewing articles that were pub-
lished in direct responses to Sageman’s article, and those that have cited this in the last
ﬁve years between 2014–2019. Google Scholar, Web of Science, EBSCO Discovery and
PubMed databases were searched in order to identify relevant literature, and further docu-
ments were identiﬁed via backward- and forward-citation searches.
At the time, and in direct response to Sageman’s criticisms, others painted a more posi-
tive picture of terrorism research (for example, see McCauley & Moskalenko, 2014). McCau-
ley and Moskalenko brieﬂy reviewed the literature since 9/11 and suggested that steady
progress in this area is being made. This view has been echoed by others (Gill & Corner,
2017; Gruenewald, Chermak, & Freilich, 2013; Schuurman, 2018; Silke & Schmidt-Petersen,
2017; Stern, 2014; Taylor, 2014; Youngman, 2018), and there have been a number of
studies published since 2014 that have applied empirical methods to examine real-
world data, for example, via the collation and analysis of open source data (e.g. Corner
& Gill, 2015; Ellis et al., 2016; Knight, Woodward, & Lancaster, 2017). Data have included
ﬁrst-hand interviews (e.g. by the police, press and researchers) with individuals of interest,
biographies and autobiographies, and other secondary information provided by those
with a knowledge of those individuals of interest (for example, see Bandhauer-Schoﬀ-
mann, 2010; Corner, Gill, & Mason, 2016; Gill, Horgan, & Deckert, 2014; Hemmingby &
Bjørgo, 2016; LaFree, Jensen, James, & Safer-Lichtenstein, 2018). Others have compared
diﬀerent types of extremists, for example those who opt for violent versus non-violent
action, or in terms of individual roles within a terrorist group or organisation (Gruenewald
et al., 2013; Horgan, 2014; Horgan, Shortland, Abbasciano, & Walsh, 2016; Knight et al.,
2017; Perliger, Koehler-Derrick, & Pedahzur, 2016; Simcox & Dyer, 2013).
The volume and range of academic studies cited above demonstrates an increase in
empirical research to advance our understanding of terrorism. Indeed a systematic review
of the literature published 2007–2016 showed that the use of primary data ‘has increased
considerably and continues to do so’ (Schuurman, 2018, p. 1). Thus, Sageman’s criticisms
about a scarcity of empirical literature in this area should no longer be a particular concern.
Section two: data-speciﬁc challenges for terrorism research
Despite the improvements in the literature as outlined above, several key data-speciﬁc
challenges remain. These relate mainly to the quantity and quality of data available to
researchers (either provided by governments or accessed via open sources) and
deﬁning and categorising cases, and are outlined and explored below.
Quantity and quality of data
A key challenge facing those seeking to apply an evidence-based approach to understand-
ing extremism and terrorism relates to the lack of access to (a) suﬃciently detailed data on
(b) a suﬃcient number of cases, to allow for rigorous analysis. There are large datasets such
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as the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and Proﬁles of Radicalization in the United States
(PIRUS); however, these include a range of diﬀerent types of extremists (violent and non-
violent, inspired by Islamic, right wing and other ideologies), and therefore lack the speciﬁ-
city that small datasets can provide. However, relatively small sample size for studies in this
area can present a challenge for researchers, especially those wanting to conduct quanti-
tative analyses. This issue is inevitable due to the small population of cases to study,
especially when examining particular types of terrorism. For example, a study seeking
data to compare violent versus non-violent extremists, acting alone versus as part of a
group, to include only individuals operating only in the UK, found only seven non-
violent lone actors cases to include in their sample (Knight et al., 2017).
At around the same time that this study was being conducted, two other studies were
underway. One analysed the socio-demographic characteristics and antecedent beha-
viours of 119 lone-actor terrorists from the USA and Europe (Gill et al., 2014). The other
was the ‘Countering Lone Actor Terrorism’ (CLAT) project, which examined 120 instances
of lone-actor terrorism across Europe. Sample sizes therefore varied between these three
similar (empirical, lone actor) studies. This variance was a result of diﬀerent deﬁnitions and
inclusion criteria for cases to be analysed, which diverged, for example, as to (i) their
interpretation of ‘lone’, (ii) the threshold required for an attack to be considered ‘terrorist’
in nature, and (iii) according to other study parameters regarding the nationality of indi-
viduals and timescales within which the case must have occurred. This allowed the
inclusion of some individuals in the larger two studies, for example individuals who had
committed violent crimes such as school shooter attacks.
Knight et al.’s (2017) study inclusion criteria dictated that group member extremists,
dyads and lone individuals were included, convicted of a post 9/11, extremist-related
crime (related to Islamic extremism, right wing extremism and single issues), and operating
in the UK. The resultant sample size was 40: This was the maximum number of individual
cases that could be found that comprised suﬃcient amounts of data for analysis, and ﬁtted
the deﬁnitions that determined the inclusion and exclusion of individuals. In contrast, the
CLAT project included individuals, dyads and triads operating across 30 countries between
1 January 2000 and 31 December 2014, whilst Gill et al. (2014) included post-1990 events
involving individuals and dyads operating across Europe and the USA. This demonstrates
how diﬀerent inclusion/ exclusion criteria for cases can provide a means to a larger sample
size, which can facilitate our understanding of this phenomenon, but may be problematic
in that the potential generalisability of results might be limited.
There are several other issues regarding the type and quantity of information available
for researchers to access. For example, the role of ‘media-induced contagion’ that relates
to which information and events journalists and the media are likely to report and focus
on, adding another element of reporting bias (Franzosi, 1987). Gill et al. (2014) similarly
cautioned that not all relevant plots had been captured in their databases, citing particular
diﬃculties where incidents attracted little public attention, or where plots had been aban-
doned or disrupted at an early stage, meaning they were unlikely to have entered the
public domain. Where researchers rely on open source information, they are unlikely to
be able to identify every case: plots may not be reported in the public domain, especially
if abandoned at an early stage or disrupted by authorities, and there may be variations
across countries regarding how incidents are reported (for example, they may be classiﬁed
as a ‘hate crime’ and therefore not be identiﬁed by researchers looking at extremist-related
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oﬀences) (Schmid, 2016). Similarly, some academic work such as literature reviews and
meta-analyses may suﬀer from publication bias, and research into terrorism may mainly
focus on those acts of terrorism that come to fruition, whilst failed, foiled, or thwarted
attacks may be excluded from analyses (Schmid, 2016).
Deﬁnitions and categorisation of individuals
Deﬁnitional issues can extend beyond the initial application of inclusion criteria, with vari-
ations in their application further inﬂuencing the dataset created. A key criticism of the
ﬁeld of terrorism research has been the failure to acknowledge distinctions between
diﬀerent types of terrorism, and therefore we lack a nuanced understanding of how,
when, and why individuals reach diﬀerent behavioural outcomes (Zekulin, 2016). Knight
et al. (2017) attempted to respond to this issue by comparing diﬀerent types of extremists
(violent, nonviolent, lone and group members) in their sample in order to compare and
understand the similarities and diﬀerences between these. The process for categorising indi-
viduals (as violent or nonviolent, and as lone or as group extremists) required three research-
ers to independently read through every case study developed and allocate each to a
category based on the information provided. However, categorising individual cases
proved to be problematic for several reasons, relating mainly to the deﬁnitions developed
at the start of the study to determine the inclusion or exclusion of speciﬁc cases in the
dataset to be analysed. Despite signiﬁcant eﬀort to develop precise deﬁnitions and criteria
for inclusion and exclusion, when evaluating real-life cases, a number of diﬃculties arose
that required deﬁnitions and criteria to be reviewed and reﬁned. Moreover, despite these
eﬀorts the process remained diﬃcult for some of the cases, and 16 case studies were even-
tually excluded from the dataset (reducing the sample from 56 to 40).
The above demonstrates various diﬃculties in deﬁning and categorising individuals of
this kind, for example:
i. If an oﬀender is arrested and convicted prior to execution of a violent act, can we be
certain that they would have gone on to perform the action? That is, can we categor-
ise them as ‘violent’ when they have not actually conducted a violent act, if there is
strong evidence that they fully intend to do so?
ii. If an oﬀender conducts a nonviolent action (e.g. provide weapons/ explosives) that
would directly contribute to and/or facilitate a violent terrorist attack, should we cat-
egorise them as violent or nonviolent?
iii. How can we know which nonviolent extremists are likely to remain nonviolent, and
which will move towards violence at a later point?
iv. If an oﬀender conducts an attack alone, but has varying degrees of contact with other
extremists, at which point should they be categorised as a group member rather than
a lone extremist?
The issue of non-violent individuals who might potentially be violent in the future has
been explored (Sarma, 2017), and others have presented considered discussions and
options regarding the diﬃculties in categorising an individual as ‘lone’ (Ellis et al., 2016;
Schuurman et al., 2019). How researchers respond to these kinds of questions will deter-
mine which cases are included in their analyses, and it is likely that the more precise the
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inclusion criteria, the smaller the sample will be. Therefore researchers need to balance the
need for speciﬁcity against the need for larger sample sizes.
Whilst a larger sample may be desirable, there is also the issue of missing data to con-
sider. Knight et al. (2017) chose to exclude cases where substantial data were missing,
including only cases where information available was of suﬃcient depth and quality to
allow independent coders to reach an agreement as to how they should be categorised.
Available information varied dramatically regarding the length of case studies, with the
word count ranging between 428–5257 words; thus, it was rich for some (i.e. those that
were high proﬁle and of interest to the media), mainly those involving violent attacks con-
ducted by extremist group members and lone actors: Both of these generated consider-
ably more information than the other sub-groups and for nonviolent cases, information
was often scarce and/or diﬃcult to verify. Such challenges are regularly encountered by
researchers seeking to use open source data, and diﬀerent approaches to dealing with
missing data have implications for data validity and interpretation of ﬁndings (Safer-Lich-
tenstein, LaFree, & Loughran, 2017). Moreover, ‘even small amounts of missing data can
lead to large uncertainty in prediction’, and therefore researchers must be transparent
in terms of the assumptions they make in order to deal with the issue of missing data
(Safer-Lichtenstein et al., 2017, p. 281).
Even where studies adopt consistent deﬁnitions, limitations in their application can
continue to undermine opportunities for wider comparison (along with their immediate
ﬁndings). The absence of consistent deﬁnitions and variation in inclusion criteria can
lead to substantial variations in the datasets to be analysed. We propose that this ‘thin
slicing’ based on diﬀerent deﬁnitions is making the literature replete with too many
studies that are harder to aggregate.
Section three: collaboration between governments and academia
Above we explore the advances made by academia to improve the terrorism literature,
and ongoing issues that they face to ensure that research in this area is scientiﬁc, rigorous
and evidence-based. However, another theme that emerged from Sageman’s critique
related to governmental approaches to terrorism. For example how they identify and
apply ‘evidence’ from the terrorism literature to inform CT responses and their decision
making regarding the research they opt to fund, and how this can hamper advances in
understanding for both the intelligence community and academia. Whilst we have been
able to systematically review the literature to understand the advances that have been
made since 2014, it is harder to assess changes in government systems, how they make
funding decisions and set their requirements and work with academics to facilitate
research in this ﬁeld. This is because, for example, the information may not be easily acces-
sible and will vary between countries and diﬀerent government departments. However,
below we set out and examine some key examples of advances that have been made
in the UK and US, and where challenges remain.
Sageman claimed that government strategies are often reactive, and reliant on infor-
mation from self-proclaimed ‘experts’, much of which lacks the rigour that academia pro-
vides. The increase in empirical research in this ﬁeld provides governments with more and
better evidence to inform decisions, for example in terms of whom and what to fund.
However, stakeholders and end users do not always possess the skills needed to critically
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evaluate what they read and identify that which can be acted upon, how it can be applied
and that which should be discarded and ignored (see Section Four for an expansion of this
point). Moreover, government departments are inevitably inﬂuenced by changes regard-
ing the political parties in charge and the political environment more generally. For
example, the recent inquiries into three separate terrorist attacks in the UK, at Manchester
Arena, London Borough market and Westminster Bridge, have meant that Islamic-related
terrorism has attracted the attention of the media and the public. This has led to pressure
on the UK government to ensure and assure that such events will not be repeated.
These types of external pressures, plus internal pressures to appeal to voters and a need
to be seen to be addressing high proﬁle current issues may inevitably lead to reactive,
short-term responses. For example, as seen with the UK CT strategy (CONTEST), ﬁrst devel-
oped in 2003, which was heavily criticised for focusing solely on the threat from Islamic
individuals. This narrow focus has been accused of fuelling Islamophobia, leading to mar-
ginalisation of Muslims communities, and not necessarily helping protect the UK public
from future threats. Moreover, any government focus on a certain type of terrorism is
likely to drive and be reﬂected in terrorism research: Schuurman (2019) demonstrated
that the literature remains over-focused on the threat posed by jihadism and noted a
dearth of empirical research on other types of terrorism, such as that involving extreme
right-wing individuals. The latter pose an ongoing and increasing threat, and empirical
research in this area is urgently needed.
Another of Sageman’s key criticisms was that government agencies have access to
detailed data that is needed to advance our understanding of extremism (see also Gill
et al., 2014; Stern, 2014); but, that they do not share this with independent researchers
who have the skills and resources to examine and make sense of this information in a
scientiﬁc and rigorous manner. Researchers often assume that governments have the
data that they need to address important questions, and Sageman stressed a need for
an appetite and mechanisms that encourage and enable sharing of data between govern-
ments and academia. However, cases of governments providing or even facilitating access
to data remain rare. This may be because they do not have the data that others assume
they do, due to sensitivities with data, or because the processes in place to protect data
(and individuals) create obstacles for sharing.
For example, in the UK there is a clear process for researchers to request access to con-
victed terrorists in prison in order to collect ﬁrst-hand data. The ﬁrst part of this process is
fairly straightforward, involving the researcher making an application to Her Majesty’s
Prison and Probation Service. However, even if the request for access to prisoners is
approved, the permission and support of various gatekeepers involved in the manage-
ment and welfare of oﬀenders is also required. Gatekeepers include Prison Governors,
Oﬀender Managers, and Psychologists, all of which may obstruct researchers accessing
oﬀenders because, for example, they may not appreciate the potential beneﬁts of
research, or they simply do not have the time and resources needed to enable access
and make data collection happen. And of course, the oﬀender also needs to consent to
participating in the proposed research, which presents another potential challenge to
researchers seeking to collect ﬁrst-hand data. As such, whilst there may be room for
improvement regarding government systems and how they might facilitate empirical
research in this ﬁeld, there remain other issues which may be out of their control.
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Regarding the ‘unbridgeable gap’ noted by Sageman (2014, p. 565), some serious
attempts have been made by governments to bring intelligence communities and aca-
demics together. Examples include the Centre for Research and Evidence on Security
Threats (CREST), a UK initiative with funding secured for ﬁve years, led by a consortium
of universities. Other schemes also exist, such as the US Minerva Research Initiative
(MRI), and the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START), which is led by the University of Maryland. MRI and START were established
before Sageman’s critique, but CREST was established since then in 2015, and sets out a
number of sensible goals. These include: (i) to address stakeholder requirements; (ii) to
identify and address gaps in the literature; (iii) to produce outputs that describe the
‘state-of-the-art’ regarding potential solutions to security; (iv) to facilitate engagement
and relationships between academic, stakeholder and public communities; and (iv) to
support the professional development of new and existing researchers and educators. If
these aims are achieved, CREST should help address a number of Sageman’s key concerns
related to government-academic collaborations.
As well as those outlined above, there are other initiatives driven by governments that
seek to bring together academic, stakeholder and end user communities. For example, the
Defence and Security Accelerator (DASA) is a UK framework set up to: (i) collect require-
ments from across diﬀerent government departments, customers and stakeholders; and
(ii) facilitate joint funding to support research that addresses Defence and Security
(D&S) problems and builds capability required for the future. DASA has themed calls
that focus on speciﬁc areas of interest to those responsible for D&S, and an ‘Open Call’
whereby researchers can propose innovative ideas and solutions to D&S challenges.
Whilst eﬀorts such as those described above have been made to ensure that pro-
grammes of research are based on sensible questions, that they are forward thinking,
and will lead to practical solutions for CT practitioners, several other problems are
worth mentioning here. One is that, as Sageman noted, governments often require
quick solutions to complex problems. As such, researchers are required to be ‘agile’ and
‘ﬂexible’, in order to generate results fast. This means that sometimes the method and
approach taken will not necessarily match the high scientiﬁc quality associated with aca-
demic research; a sometimes inevitable result of conducting research in ‘the real world’
(for example, issues explored in Section Two regarding quantity and quality of data,
missing data and so on). This can deter researchers from involving themselves in govern-
ment research programmes, especially if their outputs cannot be published.
The likelihood and appetite of governments to publish research that they fund is low
compared to the drive in academia to ‘publish or perish’. Governments are not driven
by this need to continually publish their work, and may not publish ﬁndings because
these have security implications. This means that whilst advances in knowledge might
be made, academics may not necessarily be aware of these; leading to misunderstandings
regarding what research is needed and where the gaps are, and a focus on certain areas
that are either (a) no longer of concern, or (b) well understood due to in-house research
that has not been published. Moreover, Social and Behavioural Science expertise usually
does exist ‘in-house’ within relevant government departments, and this expertise will be
informed by academic research. Formal and informal and networks between government
departments and academics also exist, therefore government strategies, policies and
research programmes should where possible reﬂect ﬁndings from the literature.
8 S. KNIGHT AND D. A. KEATLEY
Section Four: evidence-based counter terrorism in practice
Above we explore certain challenges for terrorism researchers and governments respon-
sible for CT eﬀorts. In this last section we explore ongoing issues facing CT practitioners
and potential solutions to these. The term ‘practitioner’ is used here to mean those with
a responsibility to pursue potential terrorists, and /or prevent, protect against or
prepare for a hostile attack. We describe the general goals of practitioners around the
‘4Ps’ (Prevent, Pursue, Protect, and Prepare) of the UK government’s CT strategy
(CONTEST): For example, law enforcement and security agencies – that need to detect
and apprehend potential attackers, prison and probation staﬀ – that conduct risk assess-
ments on incarcerated individuals in order to advise on how these should be managed,
and policy makers and intervention providers – that need to ensure that policies and pro-
grammes designed to deter terrorism do not contribute to the problem. Such practitioners
are skilled at developing pragmatic and concrete ways of responding to a person (or
persons) who pose a risk to national security, and are driven by the various government
departments responsible for CT policies.
It is generally agreed that CT responses should, wherever possible, be based on evi-
dence-based decision making (Gomis, 2015). Empirical research can help to ensure that
CT practitioners make evidence-based decisions that are defensible and maximise the
potential success regarding their eﬀorts. However, there is an issue with this approach:
The evidence for (push, pull, protective) factors underlying radicalisation, violent extre-
mism and terrorism, and what works regarding CT, is varied in terms of the underlying
science, the degree to which it has been tested and evaluated, and its applicability to
speciﬁc threats (for example, see Sageman, 2014; Schomerus & El Taraboulsi-McCarthy
with Sandhar, 2017). For example, diﬀerent research studies rely on data concerning
diﬀerent types of extremists (e.g. Islamic and right wing extremists, home grown terrorists,
foreign ﬁghters, lone actors, violent and nonviolent extremists and so on). Some of these
are likely to vary dramatically in terms of their characteristics and the factors that have
inﬂuenced them, therefore ﬁndings from the study of one cohort may not be applicable
to another cohort.
Whilst there is a mass of literature by academics and others seeking to understand and
prevent acts of terrorism that can be drawn on to inform CT responses, practitioners need
to be prudent when using research ﬁndings to inform their work. The applicability of these
can be aﬀected by the population/ individual characteristics, parameters of eﬀectiveness
and setting/ context. Practitioners need to be able to evaluate the evidence for (a) quality,
in terms of how scientiﬁcally robust the research is, and (b) when, to whom and how this
may or may not be applicable to the problem(s) they are addressing. However, not all
research studies fully articulate how sub-groups of extremists have been categorised,
which creates a problem for those wishing to fully understand the population under inves-
tigation, for practitioners wanting to apply ﬁndings, and for those wishing to replicate the
research. Researchers therefore need to provide detailed descriptions of their inclusion/
criteria and any other relevant information regarding how their cases were selected and
categorised. Whilst this will help, it has been recently noted that the literature remains
(over) narrowly focused on Islamic-inspired terrorism, despite right-wing inspired
attacks outnumbering jihadism in the US as well as increasing across Europe (Schuurman,
2019). Practitioners are in urgent need of empirical research that provides an
BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES OF TERRORISM AND POLITICAL AGGRESSION 9
understanding of right-wing terrorism to enable evidence-based CT interventions for this
fast growing threat.
Practitioners need to consider not only the applicability and speciﬁcity of the research
as well as the quality of the research; a problem which is compounded by the sheer
volume of literature on terrorism. Those responsible for making evidence-based decisions
regarding CT will need to sift through the massive literature in this area, which includes
news articles, books, scientiﬁc research and reports, from a range of diﬀerent perspectives
and disciplines, all of which vary signiﬁcantly in terms of the underlying science and rigour
involved. However, whilst certain relevant government agencies and units have some
form of Social Science expertise to review external work and to be cognisant of the weak-
nesses in the existing literature, some do not. Practitioners may not be equipped with the
skills to understand the underlying science and rigour (or lack of) involved, or may inad-
vertently apply ﬁndings erroneously to a problem. Academics, on the other hand, are
trained to critically evaluate literature in order to establish the quality and potential appli-
cability of empirical research to a speciﬁc problem. Therefore combining the eﬀorts of
practitioners and academics who have complementary skillsets, may be one way to
ensure the best evidence is applied to real-world problems in an appropriate way.
The study of terrorism and violent extremism is notoriously diﬃcult due to obvious
issues regarding how data can be collected and what data are available. Because research-
ers cannot easily conduct a ‘controlled’ study, or necessarily collect data direct from ‘par-
ticipants’, they often rely on data from secondary sources, which may be imperfect and
incomplete (Keatley, 2018). However, progress has been made in this area, and recent
research has begun to develop and analyse datasets comprising open source information,
indicating that there is value in examining this kind of publically available data (Keatley,
2018). Yet without the detail contained in other sources, signiﬁcant obstacles remain for
those seeking to conduct in-depth empirical research.
The sharing by authorities of available information with experienced researchers could
do much to facilitate and further understanding in this area. Any reluctance to share
potentially sensitive data is completely understandable given the sensitive nature of the
research; however, to further our understanding of why some individuals are drawn
into terrorism, we need a body of scientiﬁc research to build a comprehensive picture,
to answer questions and address problems. It is therefore important that authorities
that have access to relevant information ﬁnd ways of being able to share this with
researchers who have the time and expertise to make sense of the data. In criminology,
advancements are being made to bridge the gap between academics and applied prac-
titioners in police major crimes, the same should be facilitated in terrorism research (for
example, see Keatley & Cormier, in press). Also, a speciﬁc initiative currently funded by
the US Department of Justice/ National Institute of Justice is developing a ‘Federal Terror-
ism Court Record Repository’ that will enable access to data by a range of researchers, ana-
lysts and practitioners (J. Gruenewald, personal communication, August 16, 2019).
Moreover, easier access to incarcerated extremists could allow for the collection of ﬁrst-
hand data in a controlled and robust way (see Khalil, 2019, for a guide to interviewing ter-
rorists and violent extremists).
Above we have explored the advances made in terrorism research since Sageman’s
(2014) critique of the literature. We show that there has been a notable increase in empiri-
cal research and note that academics should, whenever possible, endeavour to (i) collect
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and share data, (ii) be clear about the cases they included / excluded, and (iii) select and
categorise cases using deﬁnitions and inclusion criteria used previously by other
researchers. The latter will allow for easier and more meaningful comparisons
between and triangulation across, research studies. We also outline government initiat-
ives that aim to enhance collaboration between intelligence communities and academia,
whilst accepting that challenges do remain. It is also important to note that practitioners
are not always involved in setting requirements and making decisions regarding funding
strategies. Mechanisms need to be in place to ensure that those on the frontline can
inform government strategies to maximise the eﬀectiveness of these strategies. More-
over, longer term programmes of work are needed to generate eﬀective solutions to
complex problems. Further focused collaborations are needed in order to identify and
understand gaps in knowledge and future threats, to ensure strategic funding decisions
are sensible. The aforementioned DASA provides one such mechanism for doing so, and
CREST is seeking to develop eﬀective collaborations between practitioners and aca-
demics with complementary skillsets. We recommend that governments continue to
develop and nurture formal and informal networks with academia, and that this
engagement informs both their short-term and long-term goals and how they aim to
achieve these.
Conclusion
The aim of the current article was to examine recent advances and ongoing challenges
regarding terrorism research against some of the key criticisms set out by Sageman ﬁve
years ago. We have also proposed some potential ways forward to address remaining
issues in order to facilitate evidence-based CT eﬀorts. It is hoped that other researchers
will respond to this article with other options and solutions and suggest further ways to gen-
erate a more nuanced understanding of diﬀerent kinds of extremism that is based on the
analysis of solid, real-world evidence. We highlight the need for government departments
to collaborate with expert researchers in the ﬁeld: If those responsible for countering extre-
mism and terrorism require a better, evidence-based understanding of this problem, then
they need to continue to identify more mechanisms to support and enable this.
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